Beverly Entr PA Inc v. Dist 1199C by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-29-1996 
Beverly Entr PA Inc v. Dist 1199C 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"Beverly Entr PA Inc v. Dist 1199C" (1996). 1996 Decisions. 125. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/125 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                           ____________ 
                           No. 95-2025 
                           ____________ 
 
              BEVERLY ENTERPRISES-PENNSYLVANIA, INC., 
        d/b/a STENTON HALL NURSING AND CONVALESCENT HOME, 
 
                                                   Appellant, 
 
                               vs. 
 
          DISTRICT 1199C NATIONAL UNION OF HOSPITAL AND 
         HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES, AFSCME, AFL-CIO; NATIONAL 
           UNION OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES, 
                         AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
 
                           ___________ 
 
           Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
                   (D.C. Civ. No. 95-cv-04755) 
                           ___________ 
 
                       Argued June 6, 1996 
         Before: BECKER and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges, and 
SCHWARZER, District Judge 
 
                      (Filed July 29, 1996) 
 
 
 
 
                        J. FREEDLEY HUNSICKER, JR., ESQUIRE 
                        (ARGUED) 
                        Drinker Biddle & Reath 
                        1345 Chestnut Street 
                        Philadelphia, PA 19107-3496 
 
                        HUGH L. REILLY, ESQUIRE 
                        Chief Counsel for Labor & Employment 
                        Beverly Enterprises 
                        5111 Rogers Avenue 
                        Ft. Smith, AR 72919 
 
                        Attorney for Beverly Enterprises- 
                        Pennsylvania, Inc. d/b/a Stenton 
                        Hall Nursing and Convalescent Home, 
                               Appellant 
 
                        GAIL LOPEZ-HENRIQUEZ, ESQUIRE 
                        (ARGUED) 
                        Freedman and Lorry, P.C. 
                        400 Market Street, Suite 900 
                        Philadelphia, PA 19106 
 
                        JAMES B. COPPESS, ESQUIRE 
                        815 16TH Street, NW 
                        Washington, D.C. 20006 
 
                        MARSHA S. BERZON, ESQUIRE 
                        Altshuler, Berzon, Nussbaum, 
                        Berzon and Rubin 
                        177 Post Street, Suite 300 
               
                        San Francisco, CA 94108 
                        Attorney for District 1199C, National 
                        Union of Hospital and Health Care 
                        Employees, AFSCME, AFL-CIO and National 
                        Union of Hospital and Health Care 
                        Employees, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Appellees 
                           ___________ 
 
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
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SCHWARZER, District Judge: 
 
         Beverly Enterprises-Pennsylvania, Inc., brought this action under 
Section 301 of 
the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.  185(a) and (c)(2), for a 
declaration that the 
union security clause in its collective bargaining agreement violates 
Section 8(a)(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), 29 U.S.C.  158(a)(3).  The 
defendant unions 
are District 1199C of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care 
Employees and the 
National Union itself.  The defendants are labor organizations and Beverly 
is an employer within 
the meaning of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.  152(2), (5).  Beverly's complaint 
alleges that the clause is 
void and unenforceable under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 
(1988).  
Assuming subject matter jurisdiction, the district court dismissed for 
lack of standing by Beverly.  
We will affirm, but on a different ground. 
         Beck was an action brought by a group of employees against their 
union. The 
plaintiff employees alleged that the union had violated Section 8(a)(3), 
the duty of fair 
representation, and their First Amendment rights, by using dues paid by 
them under the 
compulsion of a union-security clause in the collective bargaining 
agreement for noncollective 
bargaining activities.  The Supreme Court held that the Section 8(a)(3) 
claim "falls squarely 
within the primary jurisdiction of the [NLRA]," but that the "court was 
not precluded . . . from 
deciding the merits of this claim insofar as such a decision was necessary 
to the disposition of 
respondents' duty-of-fair-representation challenge."  Beck, 487 U.S. at 
742-43.  The Court noted 
that the employees were not trying to circumvent the primary jurisdiction 
of the Board, but were 
claiming that the union failed to represent their interest fairly by 
negotiating and enforcing an 
agreement not in their interests and explained:  "The necessity of 
deciding the scope of 8(a)(3) 
arises because [the unions] seek to defend themselves on the ground that 
the statute authorizes 
precisely this type of agreement."  Id. 
         To put it most charitably, Beverly's claim turns Beck on its 
head.  It does not 
invoke Section 8(a)(3) as a defense for its actions.  Rather, it attempts 
to use it to attack the 
collective bargaining agreement which it negotiated with the unions.  
Putting aside the anomaly 
of an employer attacking the agreement it itself had negotiated, we hold 
the claim that the unions 
have violated Section 8(a)(3) falls squarely within the primary 
jurisdiction of the Board.  
         This Court's decision in Mack Trucks, Inc. v. International 
Union, UAW, 856 
F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1988), makes clear that the district court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over 
this dispute.  In that case, Mack brought a Section 301 action to enforce 
a collective bargaining 
agreement.  Id. at 583.  The Union disputed the existence of the agreement 
and, asserting that the 
issue fell under the primary and exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, 
challenged the court's 
jurisdiction to decide the dispute.  Id. at 583-84.  This Court held that 
Section 301 conferred 
jurisdiction on the district court to decide this particular contract 
issue -- whether the contract 
existed -- even if the Union's claim also constituted an unfair labor 
practice under the NLRA.  Id.at 590.  In reaching its decision, this Court 
distinguished cases holding that federal courts lacked 
Section 301 jurisdiction over challenges to contracts on the basis that 
they conflicted with the 
NLRA or some other external agreement.  Id. at 589. 
         Mack does not confer jurisdiction here.  Beverly's claim is not 
that no contract 
exists -- the basis of Section 301 jurisdiction in Mack.  Rather, Beverly 
claims that the contract is 
in part void and unenforceable because it violates the NLRA.  This is 
exactly the type of situation 
that Mack makes clear does not fall under the Section 301 jurisdiction of 
the federal courts.  Id.at 584. 
         Consequently, since the federal court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over this 
dispute, the judgment of the district court dismissing the complaint was 
correct and we will 
affirm it. 
